We provide a justification for political liberalism’s Reciprocity Principle, which states that political decisions must be justified exclusively on the basis of considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. The standard argument for the Reciprocity Principle grounds it in a requirement of respect for persons. We argue for a different, but compatible, justification: the Reciprocity Principle is justified because it makes possible a desirable kind of political community. The general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, we will (...) argue, helps realize joint political rule and relationships of civic friendship. The main obstacle to the realization of these values is the presence of reasonable disagreement about religious, moral, and philosophical issues characteristic of liberal societies. We show the Reciprocity Principle helps to overcome this obstacle. (shrink)

This study investigates the ability of individuals with psychopathy to perform passive avoidance learning and whether this ability is modulated by level of reinforcement/punishment. Nineteen psychopathic and 21 comparison individuals, as defined by the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (Hare, 1991), were given a passive avoidance task with a graded reinforcement schedule. Response to each rewarding number gained a point reward specific to that number (i.e., 1, 700, 1400 or 2000 points). Response to each punishing number lost a point punishment specific (...) to that number (i.e., the loss of 1, 700, 1400 or 2000 points). In line with predictions, individuals with psychopathy made more passive avoidance errors than the comparison individuals. In addition, while the performance of both groups was modulated by level of reward, only the performance of the comparison population was modulated by level of punishment. The results are interpreted with reference to a computational account of the emotional learning impairment in individuals with psychopathy. (shrink)

Is it remarkable that the Royal Dutch Medical Association as a medical professional organization has the point of view that in particular circumstances euthanasia is an acceptable act for a physician. Seen from the viewpoints in the international community, we might say that it is highly remarkable. Frankly put: the RDMA has met strong international disapproval of its standpoint on euthanasia during the last 10 years or so. For instance, the World Medical Association still condemns physicians performing euthanasia as “unethical.” (...) So far the RDMA is the only professional medical organization that holds the view that in particular cases euthanasia is morally acceptable. However, viewed within the context of Dutch society, the Dutch system of healthcare, and the sociocultural approach to moral questions in The Netherlands, the RDMA point of view ceases to be reprehensible. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen, James Beattie (1735–1803) was one of the most prominent literary figures of late eighteenth-century Britain. His major works, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770) and the two-canto poem The Minstrel (1771–1774), were two of the best-sellers of the Scottish Enlightenment and were key to Beattie’s role in the emergence of both the ‘Scottish School’ of Common Sense Philosophy and British Romanticism. Intellectual history scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment (...) has tended to discuss Beattie in terms of his relationship to his fellow Aberdonian Thomas Read. While clearly important, his link with Reid does not exhaust our potential interest in Beattie. This article explores his extensive engagement with the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). In the process, it is argued that the Genevan’s works – especially the Confession of the Savoyard Vicar in Emile (1762) – played an important though little noticed role in both Beattie’s rhetoric and anti-scepticism in both the Essay and Minstrel. Moreover, Beattie’s initially praising stance on Rousseau as a potential friend to true religion indicates the complexity of the reception of the Genevan’s works in late eighteenth-century Britain. (shrink)

There is increasing recognition among bioethicists that health-care practitioners' everyday ethical challenges ought to be the focus of ethical analysis. Interviews were conducted with Australian junior doctors to identify some of the kinds of situations that they found ethically challenging, as a basis for this type of grounded philosophical analysis and for further empirical research into junior doctors' ethical issues. Fourteen doctors in their first to fourth year of work from six hospitals in Melbourne participated. Issues discussed included involvement in (...) treatment perceived as inappropriate, seniors discouraging disclosure of errors, coping when requested help was not forthcoming, observing behaviour perceived as unethical, truth-telling and informed consent. The difficulties described often focused on interactions with colleagues and position in the health-care team. Although the results cannot be generalized to junior doctors as a population, these junior doctors' stories point to various issues warranting further investigation, both philosophical and empirical. (shrink)

Patients who are dying of cancer usually give up eating and then stop drinking. This raises ethical dilemmas about providing nutritional support and fluid replacement. The decision-making process should be based on a knowledge of the risks and benefits of giving or withholding treatments. There is no clear evidence that increased nutritional support or fluid therapy alters comfort, mental status or survival of patients who are dying. Rarely, subcutaneous fluid administration in the dying patient may be justified if the family (...) remain distressed despite due consideration of the lack of medical benefit versus the risks. Some cancer patients who are not imminently dying become dehydrated from reversible conditions such as hypercalcaemia. This may mimic the effects of advanced cancer. These conditions should be sought and fluid replacement therapy should be given along with the specific treatments for the condition. (shrink)

The traditional view was that a concept must be immediate if anything is, i.e., it must be something possessed directly by my mind. To deny this seems to be saying "I think but I don't have ideas." This is of course what the proponents of the linguistic philosophy are in effect saying, and perhaps for them it is all right. Professor Price has argued ingeniously against the whole linguistic position: against the possibility of a purely linguistic solution to the problem. (...) Yet whether we follow Price or the language philosophers we are forced into a rather puzzling situation. One likes to say that one has ideas, thoughts, concepts, but there is a serious question as to whether we can ever actually cognize such entities. Indeed Price introspects and does not find them. Most of us--including our linguistic colleagues--would be quick to agree. A thought cannot be introspected like an image. There just does not seem to be anything there. As thinkers of thoughts, we are looking inward toward nothing; we are indeed living examples of "hollow men." So it is that we are faced with a dilemma. Either we say we think but do not really have ideas, or we must somehow show that such concepts are actually immediate after all. Neither alternative seems the least bit welcome. The latter seems utterly impossible. (shrink)

Excluding only pure nominalists and "imagists" he includes in the classical theory "almost everyone who lived before the second decade of the twentieth century." This of course covers most of the other general types of theory found in the epistemology textbooks: that concepts are in the mind, that they are also in the thing, and finally that they are fundamentally prior to the thing. These types may be exemplified by Locke, Aristotle, and Plato, respectively. The controversy between these three schools (...) Price feels can for his purposes be regarded as a "domestic difference within the classical tradition." His subsidiary discussions of these differences he confines almost entirely to the first two. The Platonic theory he handles very lightly and gingerly; "it is a sufficiently difficult task in these days to convince people that there is any sense in talking of universals at all, even in the mild and moderate Aristotelian way". (shrink)

As critical incidents and terrorist threats are on the increase, the military/SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) aspects of U.S. civilian policing are being expanded. The person called upon as a last resort to kill the criminal agent has a unique position on the SWAT team. The police sniper is asked to kill with premeditation and usually not in a situation of self-defense. Very little appears in the ethics literature analyzing the morality of the sniper role. This paper will tentatively outline (...) a process of analysis that draws upon the framework of principles associated with the just-war tradition. Elements examined are the ends of sniper killing, intention and motives, relevant emotions, and implementation means used. The conclusion is that a plausible case can be made for the moral justification of such killing as long as certain conditions or tests are met. (shrink)

This paper first identifies briefly several interpretations of the nature of the general order of eternal objects in the Primordial Nature of God (PNG). W.A. Christian describes the timeless ordering in terms of a “general scheme of relatedness,” or “matrix,” or “reservoir of potentiality.” Others, like Hartshorne, introduce the“continuum” concept. Unfortunately, none of the above terms has strict technical or categoreal meaning in Whitehead’s metaphysics. I try to remedy this defect by utilizing the Whitehead ian notions of abstractive hierarchies and (...) contrast. My interpretation supports the idea that there is one fixed and necessary order of eternal objects in PNG. (shrink)

In 'A Note on “Scepticism and Absurdity”; ' (Inquiry, Vol. 10 [1967], No. 3), Zinkernagel has restated his attack on scepticism, maintaining that his approach, where we need only refer to a simple and inspectable fact of language, offers a decisive argument against scepticism. It is suggested that Zinkernagel's optimism is unwarranted because on close inspection his general theory reveals some serious complexities, and it is shown that in his own terms Zinkernagel's second rule is not a condition for description.

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses Aristotle's conceptions of nature, change, and potentiality; the four causes, spontaneity, and chance; teleology and hypothetical necessity; and also Aristotle's account of action, freedom, and responsibility. The choice facing Greek philosopher‐scientists is simple: show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected processes, or pursue a teleological explanation, insisting on the activity of divine intelligence in the cosmos. Aristotle, Hankinson writes, pursues a middle way between these options, although, ultimately, Aristotle takes the whole (...) structure of the cosmos to be teleologically organized. Aristotle rejects Plato's metaphysics of perfect hypostasized forms and divinely directed teleology: relying heavily on his concept of phusis or nature, Aristotle makes teleology an internal principle governing the development of natural objects. Aristotle distinguishes four causes or causal factors in explanation: matter, form, agent, and end, and he distinguishes sharply between regular natural events that can be explained by means of these causes, and chance events, which do not admit full explanation. (shrink)

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses the major Hellenistic Medical theories and figures, from the Alexandrian doctors Herophilus and Erasistratus in the third century bc to the Empiricist, Rationalist, and Methodist schools of the early Imperial period. Hankinson argues that the practical basis of medical science broadened and deepened the debate about the nature of causal explanation. The Empiricists were sceptics in their attitude to causes, thinking that observation and report of evident conditions and their cures was sufficient for medical science, (...) and thus eschewing causal theory. Rationalist doctors attacked the inadequate methodology of the Empiricists, and they try to explain why the antecedent cause should bring on such and such an effect, while emphasizing the need to decide rationally the proper use of induction, and the relevancy of similarities. The Methodists treat as irrelevant antecedent causes or factors, and they recognized just two pathological conditions—relaxation and constriction; the doctor's concern is to determine by direct observation in which state is the body. (shrink)